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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
With economic globalization and multinational corporations’ expansion and increas-
ing influence, new legal issues arise. These corporations sometimes have a negative 
impact on local communities in developing countries in form of damage to health, 
environmental damage or human rights violations. Due to lack of sufficient legal 
regulation in these countries the victims of such harm caused by these activities run 
the risk of being left with no means of compensation.
1
  The question is then if and 
how multinational corporations can be held legally accountable. As a possible solu-
tion to this problem, a new form of legal trend called “foreign direct liability” has 
emerged and is now gradually finding its way into European court rooms.
2
  
1.1.1 Definition 
The question of foreign direct liability arises when victims of for example environ-
mental damage or human rights violations caused by the activities of typically a sub-
sidiary company aim to hold the parent company legally responsible on the basis of 
tort law. The damage is usually sustained in a developing country where the subsidi-
ary company is located (the host state). The parent company is often located in a 
western country where the tort law provides higher standards of care, regulatory 
standards and damage awards (the home state).
3
 These cases are often filed as class 
actions where the claimants are locals in the host country and are sometimes accom-
panied by non-profit organizations.
4
 This form of litigation has already been going 
on in the US for some time by applying the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATS). However, 
                                                 
1
 Buggenhoudt (2011) pp. 7-8 
2
 Enneking (2009) pp. 903-904 
3
 Enneking (2012) p. 92; Enneking (2009) p. 928 
4
 See chapter 2.1.3.1. 
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the differences between the two continents’ legal systems give rise to different ques-
tions.
5
 
 
The proceedings in a foreign direct liability case brought before European courts can 
roughly be separated into three legal issues or obstacles which, from the plaintiff’s 
point of view, need to be overcome. These obstacles can consist of rules of private 
international law and EU-law as well as domestic law. The first obstacle is jurisdic-
tion. The relevant rules concerning choice of jurisdiction must be applied in order to 
decide whether the case can be heard in the court of the parent company’s home state 
by appointing jurisdiction to the home state forum. The second obstacle is the choice 
of law. The claimant will in most cases wish for the home state’s law to be applica-
ble. The court found eligible to hear the case will then have to apply the relevant 
choice of law rules. If the rules governing the choice of law appoint the law of the 
home state to be applicable, the final obstacle will be the domestic rules of law in the 
forum state. One question that arises under this issue, and also in relation to the two 
foregoing obstacles, is how the parent company can be held liable for the subsidi-
ary’s tortious activities despite the long accepted notion of the shareholders limited 
liability.
6
 It is important to emphasize that these are only legal obstacles. The geo-
graphical distance and other practical or procedural circumstances both in the home 
country and host country may entail other.
7
 The focus of this thesis will be on the 
three aforementioned legal obstacles.  
1.2 Questions and outline 
With the foregoing background, this thesis will have its emphasis on foreign direct 
liability in a European context and on cases concerning environmental damage. The 
                                                 
5
 Enneking (2009) p. 904-905 
6
 Vanderkerckhove (2007) p. 1 
7
 Enneking (2012) p. 7 
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legal focus will be on the relevant rules of EU law and case law related to foreign 
direct liability.  
 
- In order for the claimant to have the case heard where the parent company is 
located, this country must be selected as the forum state. How can such juris-
diction be established in a foreign direct liability case under relevant EU reg-
ulations on jurisdiction? 
 
- For the claimant to benefit from the environmental standards and tort law of 
the home country these laws must be found applicable. How can this be ob-
tained under EU regulations regarding choice of law? 
 
- The claimant seeks to hold the parent company liable for the damage. How 
does foreign direct liability for environmental damage correspond with the 
traditional principle of EU company law of the shareholders limited liability? 
 
To place these issues in a wider perspective, the question of what role foreign direct 
liability might play in the development of corporate social responsibility in Europe 
will also be tentatively indicated. 
 
The ambition of this thesis is to contribute to answering these questions. The struc-
ture will be as follows; Chapter two to three will focus on whether and how each of 
the above-mentioned obstacles, namely jurisdiction, choice of law and issues of the 
parent company’s liability, can be overcome. The fourth chapter will tentatively indi-
cate the foreign direct liability cases’ effect on the promotion of corporate social re-
sponsibility within the EU. 
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1.3 Method 
This thesis is written in English mainly due to practical reasons, seeing as most of the 
relevant sources are in English. Norwegian legal terminology does not even offer a 
Norwegian alternative to the English term “foreign direct liability”.  
1.3.1 EU legislation and EU case law 
Since the geographical perspective of this thesis is European the applicable sources 
of law will be the same, more specifically the law applicable to countries in their 
capacity as EU Member States.  
 
Europe is probably the area of the world that has gotten furthest towards harmoniza-
tion of private international law.
8
 The instruments that will be referred to most fre-
quently are Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgements in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) and Regulation 864/2007 
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) in addition to related 
case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the Court”).  
 
When applying these EU instruments the focus will be on the provisions that are rel-
evant in the proceedings of a foreign direct liability case. They will be given a gen-
eral interpretation and included in a further discussion on how they can promote or 
obstruct the establishment of foreign direct liability in Europe.  
 
A challenge when applying these instruments is that some of them are fairly new and 
yet to be applied in the context of the topic for this thesis. No legislature, let alone a 
law student, can predict with certainty the future effect of a new provision. However, 
these instruments’ predecessors9 and preparatory works as well as related case law 
                                                 
8
 Calster (2013) p. 2 
9
 Calster (2013) p. 19--20 
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can give a fairly good indication of how they might apply in future foreign direct 
liability cases. 
1.3.2 Other legislation 
Despite the movement towards European harmonization, domestic legislation specif-
ic to each Member State still plays an important role.
10
 Domestic rules of private 
international law, procedural law, tort law and company law from selected Member 
States will be introduced in order to illustrate, to the limited extent that is possible 
within the boundaries of time and space of this thesis, how, despite the harmoniza-
tion of European private international law completed so far, the applicable domestic 
law may affect the final outcome of a foreign direct liability case. 
1.3.3 Case law on foreign direct liability  
To get an impression of how foreign direct liability works it is necessary to examine 
some of the cases brought before courts within the EU where this approach has been 
attempted. The cases I have found have mainly been brought before Dutch and Brit-
ish courts. Even though a great deal of the rules regarding private international law in 
Europe are unified in international regulations, the issue of whether foreign direct 
liability shall be established is in the end solved in a domestic court.
11
 This case law 
might provide information on whether European courts are open to establish this 
form of liability for environmental dasmage, and if they do not, what barriers would 
have to be overcome in order for them to do so. Most of the cases referred to in the 
following presentation have previously been described as a foreign direct liability 
case by authorities in this area or been applied as an example in discussions on this 
issue.
12
 However, it is quickly evident that none of them comprise all the characteri-
zations that are usually given to such cases.
13
  
                                                 
10
 Enneking (2009) p. 928 
11
 Calster (2013) p.2 
12
 Enneking (2012) p. 92-104 and Cordero-Moss (2013) p. 358 
13
 See definition in chapter 1.1.1.   
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Applying this case law is a bit of a challenge. First of all, with foreign direct liability 
being a fairly new phenomenon in Europe, case law on this topic is scarce. Secondly, 
not all the judgments are available in English. I have therefore had to rely on transla-
tions and secondary sources such as articles and press releases. This case law will 
only serve as illustrative examples without any attempt at a proper comparative anal-
ysis.  
1.3.4 Literature  
There is an ample amount of literature on private international law and corporate 
social responsibility. However, there is not all that much devoted specifically to the 
concept of foreign direct liability. A very interesting new study on the topic is the 
one by Liesbeth Enneking from 2012 which will therefore be referred to frequently.  
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2 Jurisdiction 
The first obstacle in the procedure of a foreign direct liability case is for the Europe-
an domestic court to determine whether it has jurisdiction.  This will be the premise 
for the court to hear the relevant case. The procedural rules of the home state may be 
better suited for the circumstances characteristic to such a case than those of the host 
country.
14
  
2.1 The parent company -The Brussels I Regulation 
In EU Member States the question of jurisdiction over foreign direct liability cases 
will usually be determined by Regulation No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, commonly 
referred to as “Brussels I”. Brussels I has recently undergone revision and will be 
replaced by Regulation No. 1215/2012. The new regulation will apply from 2015.
15
 
What effect the revision may have on future foreign direct liability cases will be ex-
amined in a separate chapter.
16
 The content of Brussels I is similar to its predecessor 
The Brussels Convention and it may, together with other sources related to this con-
vention, be relevant when interpreting the current regulation.
17
  
 
It is worth mentioning that some European states have developed common rules on 
jurisdiction similar to the provisions in Brussels I laid out in The New Lugano Con-
vention. All Member States, including some outside the EU, are party to this conven-
tion. The purpose of Lugano is to extend the application of Brussels I. In order to 
carry out this purpose it is desirable to obtain an autonomous interpretation of both 
instruments and the Court has authority to interpret this convention. The sources ap-
                                                 
14
 Enneking (2012) pp. 133 and 146 
15
 Regulation No. 1215/2012 Article 81 
16
 See chapter 2.2 
17
 Calster (2013) p. 19-20 
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plied when establishing the content of Brussels I will therefore also be relevant to the 
interpretation of the Lugano convention.
18
 
2.1.1 Scope of application 
The regulation concerns “civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the 
court or tribunal”.19 It is common to specify what “civil and commercial” law is by 
making a distinction between this and “public” law. Although the correct distinction 
has not been fully settled between the Member States
20
 it is unlikely that this would 
be an issue in a foreign direct liability case since these would deal with tort which is 
traditionally considered to be civil and commercial matters.
21
  
 
The existence of an international element is required for the regulation to apply in the 
particular case.
22
 This requirement is also unlikely to be a difficult issue in a foreign 
direct liability case, seeing as one of the characterizations given to such cases is the 
element of transnational litigation. This view finds support in the Court’s case law on 
the matter, as for example the Owusu case, which provides that the involvement of a 
Member State and a non-Member State is sufficient to make the case international in 
nature.
23
  
 
It is also required mentioning that the parties are for the most part free to enter into 
an agreement concerning the jurisdiction over a dispute between them.
24
 However, it 
is unlikely for the parties to enter into an agreement on jurisdiction before the dam-
age occurs, seeing as a relationship between them in form of a contractual obligation 
                                                 
18
 Cordero-Moss (2013) p. 31 
19
 Brussels I article 1 
20
 Calster (2013) p. 27 
21
 Rogerson (2012) p. 55 
22
 Calster (2013)  p. 25 
23
 C-281/02 para. 26 
24
 Brussels I article 23 
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does not exist. It is also unlikely that parties would enter into an agreement after the 
dispute arises, due to the incompatible interests involved. In conclusion, the provi-
sions in Brussels I will most likely be fully applicable in these cases.  
2.1.2 Main provision 
According to article 2 of the Regulation a person domiciled in a Member State shall 
be sued in the courts of that Member State. The further question would then be when 
a company is considered “domiciled” in a Member State. The answer is provided by 
article 60 which stipulates that a company is domiciled where it has its statutory seat 
or central administration or principal place of business. Brussels I thus seems to give 
a simple answer to the question of jurisdiction; the parent company is to be sued in 
the court where it is domiciled and the company is domiciled where it has its statuto-
ry seat etc. In a case concerning foreign direct liability these provisions would give 
an EU Member State’s court jurisdiction where the parent company has its main lo-
cation within that Member State. Thus, the regulation provides a fairly simple solu-
tion to the question of jurisdiction in cases concerning European-based companies. 
25
 
As provided by article 2, the Member State court will have jurisdiction regardless of 
the claimant’s nationality. However, there are other provisions of the regulation 
which, based on the specific circumstances of the case, can offer additional options 
of competent EU forums.
26
  
2.1.3 Special jurisdiction 
The rules of special jurisdiction laid out in article 5 might be of use for the claimant 
in a foreign direct liability case. While the basic rule in article 2 is based on the con-
nection between the defendant and the forum, the result in article 5 depends on a 
connection between the claim and the forum.
27
 These provisions give the option of 
                                                 
25
 Calster (2013) p. 237 
26
 Enneking (2012) p. 146 
27
 Clarkson (2011) p. 80 
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granting jurisdiction to another Member State in cases where there is more than one 
potential EU-based defendant. Being able to choose between forums can be benefi-
cial where one country has procedural rules that are more favorable to the claimant’s 
case and particularly when the case might only be admissible under the procedural 
rules of one of the Member States. 
2.1.3.1 Class actions as a general illustration 
This option of choice in article 5 can have a decisive influence on the outcome where 
the choice of jurisdiction under the main provision in article 2 does not allow class 
actions,
28
 which are quite common in cases concerning foreign direct liability. One 
example of a case where a class action was filed is the Trafigura case. Trafigura is an 
international commodities trading and logistics company.
29
 In 2006 the ship Probo 
Koala, chartered by Trafigura, unloaded a shipment of toxic waste in the Ivory Coast. 
Over 30 000 Ivorians brought a class action against the company in the UK claiming 
that the exposure to the toxic waste caused them personal injuries. The parties 
reached an out of court settlement in 2009, so the question of jurisdiction was never 
settled before a court.
30
 Another example is the case of Lubbe and others v. Cape plc 
where the number eventually amounted to over 7 500 claimants.
31
  
 
The access to file a class action was an issue for the court in the most recent cases on 
foreign direct liability, The Royal Dutch Shell cases. Four Nigerian farmers and fish-
ermen initiated lawsuits against Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) and its Nigerian subsidiar-
ies, including Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (SPDC), 
claiming that they were responsible for oil spills in their local community. The 
claimants held that the spills caused damage to their health and livelihoods. The 
                                                 
28
 Enneking (2013) p.146 
29
 Trafigura (2013) 
30
 Enneking (2012) p. 102-103 
31
 Ward (2002) p. 8 
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spills were proven to have been caused by sabotage.
32
 The environmental organiza-
tion Milieudefensie also initiated proceedings against the companies. The court 
found Milieudefensie’s claims admissible under Dutch procedural law, more specifi-
cally section 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code, despite Shell’s arguments that the basis 
for this was a rule of substantive Dutch law. Shell argued this because, when as-
sessing the choice of laws, Nigerian law was found by the court to be applicable and 
therefore only Dutch rules of a procedural character were to be applied.
33
 In this case 
the organization did not get much further than that however. Even though Dutch pro-
cedural rules did indeed give organizations like this the access to defend the right of 
third parties, Nigerian law did not provide Milieudefensie with the right to compen-
sation, since no damage occurred to them as a result of the oil spills.
34
  
 
The Cape plc case, the Trafigura case and the Royal Dutch Shell case, all containing 
class actions, show that the access within the procedural rules of a forum state can 
have a crucial impact on the outcome of a foreign direct liability case and that the 
options the special rules of jurisdiction in article 5 provide can be of good use. In-
deed, none of them serve as a perfect example, due to the particular facts of the cas-
es. However, they do show the possibilities for the claimant in a foreign direct liabil-
ity case that might be initiated against a company domiciled in a Member State in the 
future and that, if there are multiple EU defendants, the choice of forum can be deci-
sive. The different circumstances that the provisions in article 5 apply to will be fur-
ther explored in the following.  
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 De Rechtspraak (2013) p. 1; Enneking (2012) pp.104-105 
33
 LJN BY9854 para. 4.11 
34
 De Rechtspraak (2013) p. 1 
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2.1.3.2 The provisions in article 5 
2.1.3.2.1 Article 5(3) 
Article 5(3) gives the option of assigning jurisdiction to the court of another Member 
State where a harmful event occurred or may occur in cases regarding “tort, delict or 
quasi delict”. According to the Court “the place where the harmful event occurred” 
can be interpreted as both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the 
event giving rise to it.
35
 This gives the claimant an opportunity to sue in another 
Member State if this is the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred, 
provided that the parent company’s actions can be considered as such an event.36 In a 
foreign direct liability case, where the defendants are international corporations with 
establishments in several countries, it is not unlikely that the event giving rise to the 
environmental damage outside the EU is constituted by the sum of decisions made in 
different Member States. The options offered the claimants where there are multiple 
corporate defendants in different Member States will be discussed under article 5(5).    
2.1.3.2.2 Article 5(4) 
In some cases the tortious activity giving rise to the civil claim also constitutes a 
criminal offence. Also here, the Trafigura case can serve as an example. In 2010 
Trafigura was convicted for the same incident in the Amsterdam Court under EU-law 
and Dutch law for importing the hazardous waste to Amsterdam and for subsequent-
ly exporting it to Africa. The company had to pay one million euros in penalties.
37
  
Trafigura appealed to the Dutch Appeal Court which came to the same conclusion.
38
 
In 2012 a settlement was reached with the Dutch authorities. The settlement included 
the original one million euro fine in addition to 300 000 euros paid to the Dutch au-
                                                 
35
 Case 21/76 Para. 24 
36
 Enneking (2012) p. 146 
37
 Enneking (2012) p. 103-104 
38
 Trafigura (2013) 
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thorities.
39
 If criminal proceedings is already pending in one country it might be 
practical for the liability claims to be heard within the same forum state. In this con-
nection Article 5(4) provides that the company may be sued in another state where a 
civil claim for damages or restitution also gives rise to criminal proceedings and 
these criminal proceedings are held in this other state.  
2.1.3.2.3 Article 5(5) 
Where the dispute arises “out of the operations of a branch, agency or other estab-
lishment”, article 5(5) provides the claimant with the choice to use the courts where 
this branch, agency or other establishment is situated. The rationale behind this op-
tion is that the defendant who has voluntarily extended its business through an estab-
lishment should also be held liable through such establishments.
40
 
 
This provision can prove difficult to find applicable when the company is located 
outside of Europe due to the wording “may in another Member State”.41 On the other 
hand, if the establishment is also located in a Member State this provision can be 
useful. It is not unlikely that there are several potential defendants responsible for the 
damage located in different parts of Europe when the defendant is an international 
corporation. This could give the claimant a choice.
42
 
 
“Establishment” is to be defined as a place of business possessing the appearance of 
permanency, such as the extension of a parent body, which is equipped to do busi-
ness on behalf of the parent body. Whether the establishment is a subsidiary or a de-
pendent branch does not matter as the factual relationship here prevails over defini-
tions under company law. The terms “branch” or “agency” do not involve a separate 
                                                 
39
 Reuters (2012)  
40
 Mankowski (2012) p. 277 
41
 Calster (2013) p. 238 
42
 Enneking (2012) p. 146 
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definition. They only serve as illustrations for describing the notion of “establish-
ment”.43 
 
Where there are multiple defendants the criterion in article 6(1) must be met in order 
for both or all cases to be heard within the jurisdiction that is regarded the most fa-
vorable by the claimant.
44
 According to article 6(1) several defendants can be heard 
together if the claims are so closely connected that it is “expedient” to avoid irrecon-
cilable judgments. The wording “expedient” does not give the impression that there 
has to be compelling reasons to unite the cases under the same jurisdiction, but rather 
that there has to be merely practical considerations favoring this solution.  
 
In relation to responsibility for environmental damage or other tort claims, these 
must naturally have some sort of connection with the actions of the establishment. In 
most cases, the place of the establishment will also be the place where the event giv-
ing rise to the damage occurred, thus giving article 5(3) application to the same mat-
ter.
45
 Defining “the event giving rise” to the damage will be further discussed in 
chapter 3. 
2.1.4 Forum non conveniens 
One domestic rule that has been an obstacle for foreign direct liability cases, both in 
Europe and for the ATS-based cases in the United States
46
, is the forum non conven-
iens doctrine which provides that the court may decline jurisdiction for the benefit of 
a court in another state considered to be a more appropriate as a forum for the partic-
ular case.
47
 This would be a basis for the court to refer the case to the courts of the 
                                                 
43
 C-33/78 paras. 12-13; Mankowski (2012) pp. 277-282 
44
 Enneking (2012) p. 146 
45
 Mankowski (2012) pp. 285-286 
46
 Enneking (2012) p. 86 
47
 Calster (2013) p. 107 
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host country. This doctrine has been used in common law jurisdictions such as Eng-
lish courts. One case relevant in this context is the case of Lubbe and others v. Cape 
plc.  
 
The case concerned South African plaintiffs who sought compensation for asbestos-
related health injuries caused by the activities of The Cape Asbestos Company Ltd 
by suing the parent company Cape plc situated in London. The claimants could ex-
pect a higher compensation if the case was decided in England. Cape plc argued that 
a South African forum would be more suitable to hear the case. Eventually the House 
of Lords concluded in 2000 that the proceedings could continue in England. The 
court’s reason for this decision was that the plaintiff would not receive the necessary 
legal assistance and expert advice and evidence needed if the case was referred to a 
South African court. These conditions were essential to the claimants in order to ob-
tain justice in this case.
48
  
 
In 2005 the Court ruled in the Owusu case that a Member State court cannot decline 
jurisdiction conferred to it by article 2 in the Brussels convention for the reason that a 
non-Member State would be a more appropriate forum. 
49
 The case concerned the 
interpretation of the Brussels convention, however the wording in Brussels I article 
2, as well as article 4 of the new regulation
50
, is practically identical and is therefore 
likely to be given the same interpretation. This basically rules out the possibility of 
applying forum non conveniens on cases falling under the application of article 2 of 
the Regulation in the future and makes jurisdiction of the Member State court the 
only option. Foreign direct liability cases which fall outside the scope of the Regula-
tion could still be subject to the forum non conveniens doctrine. This would typically 
                                                 
48
 Ward (2002) p. 6-8; [2000] UKHL 41 
49
 Case 281/02 Para. 53 
50
 Regulation No. 1215/2012 
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be cases brought against non-EU-based companies before a Member State court, 
which will be discussed further below.
51
 
2.2 Revision of Brussels I 
As mentioned above, the Brussels I Regulation has currently undergone revision. The 
original proposal might have had significant consequences to future foreign direct 
liability cases in Europe.
52
 This could serve as an illustration of how amendments to 
EU legislation can affect the outcome of a foreign direct liability case.  
 
For the new regulation, a new article 4(2) was proposed added, which would extend 
the application of the Regulation to defendant companies domiciled outside the un-
ion.
53
  This revision could have made it easier for a claimant in a foreign direct liabil-
ity case to sue a company before a Member State court, with the procedural and prac-
tical benefits that may follow, regardless of whether the company is domiciled in a 
Member State. A situation where jurisdiction could be extended in this way under the 
proposed revision, was through a new article 26 providing for the option of establish-
ing jurisdiction based on forum necessitatis when there is no other EU forum availa-
ble which can guarantee a fair hearing and where there is a “sufficient connection” 
between the dispute in question and the Member State concerned.
54
 According to 
article 26(a) this option would particularly be available if the proceedings cannot 
“reasonably” be brought or conducted in a third state with which the dispute is close-
ly connected or if this is “impossible". Another situation where forum necessitates 
may be invoked is, according to article 26(b), where recognition and enforcement of 
a judgment in a Member State is not possible under the law of a third state and such 
recognition and enforcement is necessary to ensure the claimants rights. It should be 
                                                 
51
 Enneking (2012) p. 149 
52
 Enneking (2012) p. 150 
53
 COM/748/2010 p. 23 
54
 COM/748/2010 p. 8 
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noted that this provision only applies “on an exceptional basis”.55 Thus, given the 
choice of wording, it seems to have been meant as a narrow exception. This new rule 
would, in the Commission’s view, be of particular relevance to companies based in 
the EU investing in countries with immature legal systems.
56
  
 
These proposals were however removed under the revisions by the European Parlia-
ment. The Committee on Legal Affairs agreed with the Parliament’s position that 
such an extension of the jurisdictional rules of the Regulation would require further 
consultation and debate. The original proposal was therefore narrowed down to ex-
tending jurisdiction to third states where it is needed to protect the weaker party, such 
as in disputes regarding employment, consumer and insurance contracts.
57
  
 
The forum necessitates rules would have been a welcome addition for claimants 
seeking to hear its case in a Member State that does not already have similar provi-
sions included in their domestic rules of jurisdiction. The proposed addition to article 
4, together with the new forum necessitates rules may have given the claimant in a 
foreign direct liability case the possibility to hear the case in a Member State even if 
the dispute is closer connected to the host country and even if the defendant company 
is not domiciled in the EU. This would be particularly beneficial for a claimant seek-
ing compensation from the host state subsidiary.
58
 
 
However, even if a forum necessitates rule applying to non-Member States had been 
included in the new regulation, this would not necessarily be all good news for the 
progress of foreign direct liability. The original proposal, extending the application to 
non-member defendants, left no room for invoking other domestic grounds for juris-
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 COM/748/2010 p. 34 
56
 COM/748/2010 p. 8 
57
 A7-0320/2012 p. 139 
58
 Enneking (2012) p. 150-151 
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diction and therefore leaving no other option than forum necessitatis. The new provi-
sion would then be the only option in a case against a non-EU based defendant.
59
 
Seeing as the proposed rule was only to apply in exceptional cases this could make it 
even more difficult to have such cases heard than it would under some of the current 
domestic rules on jurisdiction. Thus, from the view of a claimant in a foreign direct 
liability case, one might be better off the proposed changes.  
 
The committee also proposed for a new set of lis pendens rules extending the appli-
cation to third states.
60
 These provisions were included in the new regulation’s article 
33 and 34. It provides that the Member State court may stay the proceedings if simi-
lar proceedings are already initiated in another state within or outside the union. This 
might give a corporate defendant expecting to be summoned before a Member State 
court an incentive to bring an action before the courts of the host country.  The Euro-
pean court may then choose to stay the proceedings subsequently brought by the 
claimants based on the new rules of lis pendens.
61
 However, the new provisions pro-
vide a set of cumulative requirements for the court to be able to stay its proceedings. 
The case might not fulfill all these requirements. In addition, if continuation of the 
proceedings is required for “the proper administration of justice”62 or if it appears 
that the proceedings initiated in the third state is unlikely to be included within a rea-
sonable time, the Member State court may continue the proceedings. Furthermore, 
the court does not have an obligation to stay the proceedings, even if the require-
ments are met
63
, as the wording only provides that the court “may”64 do so.  It is 
                                                 
59
 Eeckhout (2011) p. 7 
60
 COM/748/2010 p. 38 
61
 Eeckhout (2011) p. 8 
62
 Regulation No. 1215/2012 article 33(2)(c), 33(2)(d) 
63
 Eeckhout (2011) p. 8 
64
 Regulation No. 1215/2012 article 33(1), article 34(1) 
19 
 
therefore not likely that these provisions will have significant impact on foreign di-
rect liability cases.  
2.3 The subsidiary –Domestic rules 
In foreign direct liability cases, the claimant may do wise in suing both the subsidiary 
and the parent company.  This is especially a wise strategy seeing as holding the par-
ent company liable for the subsidiary’s actions can prove to be a difficult task.65 In 
addition, both cases will be governed by the same procedural rules of the home state 
if the court of the home state has jurisdiction over the case against the subsidiary as 
well. The subsidiary however, is usually not domiciled in a Member State and Brus-
sels I article 4 then provides that the national rules of the Member State concerning 
jurisdiction will apply. This is especially relevant now that the proposals for extend-
ing the regulation’s application to third states were rejected. The question of jurisdic-
tion in these cases is therefore left to be decided by the domestic rules of private in-
ternational law in force in the particular forum. Some of these rules may play a sig-
nificant role in a foreign direct liability case.
66
 A full presentation of these rules 
would be too extensive in this context but a few require mention.  
 
How the claimant can have the case against the subsidiary heard in a Member state is 
illustrated in The Royal Dutch Shell cases. On the question of jurisdiction the court 
had concluded in an earlier decision that the case would proceed in The District 
Court of The Hague. There was no dispute concerning the jurisdiction of the court in 
the case against the parent company, where the court merely stated that article 2 ap-
plied. 
67
 Since Brussels I did not apply to SPDC the court applied the Dutch Code of 
Civil Procedure section 7(1) which provides that the where court has jurisdiction 
over one defendant it also has jurisdiction over another defendant in the same pro-
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ceedings, provided that the two cases are “connected to such an extent that reasons of 
efficiency justify a joint hearing”.68 In the present case the court held that the rela-
tionship between the two defendants constituted a sufficient connection to hear both 
cases in The Netherlands.
69
 In all cases, the claims against the parent were dismissed, 
while the subsidiary was held liable in one of them.
70
  
 
In countries where there are similar rules of procedure and private international law 
which allows cases concerning two defendants of different nationality to be heard 
jointly, it would therefore be a smart move of the defendant to sue both companies. 
Most Member States do have similar provisions allowing consolidation of related 
claims where only one of the defendants is domiciled in the forum state. Most of 
these domestic provisions require a connection between the claim, but the extent of 
this requirement, and how it is to be applied, differs.
71
 
 
A provision that may serve as an obstacle for hearing the case of the subsidiary is the 
earlier mentioned forum non conveniens rule of common law systems which can still 
be applicable to cases where Brussels I does not apply. The case of Lubbe and others 
v. Cape plc has shown that the forum non conveniens doctrine will not be applied in 
English courts if the court is not convinced that the parties will obtain a fair trial in 
the alternative forum.
72
 This exception to the application of forum non conveniens 
may be useful to a claimant in these cases, as the motivation for targeting the parent 
company in the home country is precisely to achieve a level of legal protection that 
the host country’s forum is unable to provide. 
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The court’s argumentation in this case is similar to the reasoning behind the forum 
necessitates doctrine which is also a common rule within some Member States.
73
 In 
these situations where forum necessitates is argued, it is usually the plaintiff who has 
the burden of proof. The conditions for establishing this kind of jurisdiction differs. 
Some domestic rules require that proceedings in the alternative forum are legally 
impossible, while others only require that a referral would be unreasonable.
74
 As 
previously argued under the proposed revisions of Brussels I, this basis for jurisdic-
tion can be a useful for the claimant in a foreign direct liability context.  
 
Several Member States have rules enabling a non-EU defendant to be sued within a 
Member State when the defendant has some sort of secondary establishment within 
the EU. Some countries require that the claim must be connected with the establish-
ment. However, some countries also allow unrelated claims to be heard by the court. 
In England and Malta the presence of a branch or agency within the country’s territo-
ry allows for the defendant to be sued in that state. In Finland it is sufficient for the 
company to have assets present within the territory of the forum state, thus, trigger-
ing the application of jurisdiction based on property.
75
 This would enable the claim-
ant to benefit from the procedural rules of a Member State, even if the event giving 
rise to the claim has no close connection to the forum state. This form of basis for 
jurisdiction is similar to the one used to justify jurisdiction over ATS-based claims in 
the United States. It has been argued that this is one of the reasons why US courts 
offer a more beneficial jurisdictional framework concerning foreign direct liability 
cases than Europe does under the provisions in Brussels I which requires the defend-
ant to be domiciled in the forum. However, the forum non conveniens doctrine still 
constitutes a threat to claimants aiming towards having the case heard in US courts, 
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while Brussels I now excludes the application of this doctrine if the defendant is al-
ready found to fall under the scope of the Regulation based on domicile.
76
  
2.4 Conclusion 
If the corporate defendant in a foreign direct liability is domiciled in a Member State, 
the claimant can be quite confident that the court in that state will have jurisdiction 
under article 2 the Brussels I Regulation. If domicile is established, the application is 
pretty straight forward. In certain cases the claimant is even given the opportunity to 
choose between different EU forums where there are multiple corporate defendants. 
The new lis pendens rules in the revised regulation may provide difficulties if appli-
cable, but they do not represent a considerable threat. All in all, the new regulation is 
not likely to have any profound influence on the feasibility of foreign direct liability 
cases brought before Member State courts.  
 
In cases where the claimant seeks to sue a non EU-based corporate defendant within 
the union, some of the rules provided by domestic private international law will 
make it possible to hear the case in a member state. The forum necessitatis provision 
can especially prove to be useful, seeing as host countries may lack the procedural 
system enabling the claimant to obtain justice.
77
 The rule of forum non conveniens 
may however prove to be an obstacle if the forum does not have an exception similar 
to the one demonstrated by English courts in the Lubbe and others v. Cape plc.   
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3 Applicable law  
In a case of foreign direct liability the court must establish whether the law of the 
home country or the host country is to be applied. This would be the second obstacle 
for the claimant. This is a crucial point in the proceedings since the standards of care, 
regulatory standards and damage awards is likely to be much higher in the home 
state than in the developing country where the subsidiary company is located.
78
 The 
choice may in particular be decisive for the outcome of the case where the host coun-
try does not have any rules giving basis for the claim at all. In order for the plaintiff 
to benefit from the legal regime in the home country, the relevant rules of domestic 
substantive law must first of all be regarded applicable by the court. Furthermore, if 
the substantive rules of law in the Member State are found applicable, the question of 
the parent company’s liability will depend largely on these rules. This will be the 
topics for discussion in this chapter.  
3.1 The Rome II Regulation 
With foreign direct liability cases being tort-based, the answer to the question of ap-
plicable law, when served to European courts today, would largely depend on the 
rules regarding conflict of laws in Regulation No. 864/2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations, commonly referred to as “Rome II”. Rome II governs 
the choice of laws in cases concerning non-contractual obligations arising out of a 
tort or delict.
79
 The scope of the applicable law is provided in article 15. It includes 
inter alia the basis and extent of liability and the assessment of damage or remedy 
claimed.  One of the main objectives when implementing this regulation as an at-
tempt to harmonize the rules regarding choice of laws within the Union was to create 
clear and predictable rules providing foreseeability and certainty as regards to their 
application.
80
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According to article 32 of Rome II it shall apply from 11 January 2009 on damages 
occurring after the time of its entry into force, which is 2007.
81
 The relevant deci-
sions on foreign direct liability so far have concerned damages occurring before this 
date of entry into force. In the Royal Dutch Shell case, which is the latest example of 
relevant case law from Europe, the court simply referred to article 31 and 32 of the 
Regulation and applied the Dutch Torts act instead.
82
 The main question is therefore 
whether the application of Rome II will have any effect on the access to establish this 
form of liability in future cases in Europe. 
 
The parties are free to agree on what should be the applicable law concerning a dis-
pute between them.
83
 They are, however, unlikely to have done so due to the same 
reasons for not entering into an agreement on jurisdiction.  
3.1.1 The general rule  
The general rule is according to article 4(1) lex loci damni;
84
 the law applicable is 
that of the country where the damage occurred. The reasoning behind this rule is the 
need for certainty in the law and that a connection with the country where the dam-
age occurred strikes a fair balance between the interests of the parties involved. Mak-
ing this the basic rule would deprive the victim of the damage to choose the law most 
favorable to him. This would, in the Commission’s view, go beyond the victim’s 
legitimate expectations.
85
 Thus, the applicable rules will be the one of the country 
where the damage occurred. It is clear that this does not correspond with the victim’s 
motivation in a foreign direct liability case to make the claim, namely, to draw bene-
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fit from the security that the home state’s law can provide. There are other provisions 
in the regulation which provide a different solution in cases where the general rule is 
not considered to provide a fair balance to be struck between the interests involved.
86
 
3.1.2 General exception 
According to article 4(3) of the regulation, if it is clear from the circumstances of the 
case that it is manifestly more closely connected to another country than the one arti-
cle 4(1) indicates, the law of this country will apply instead. Such a connection can 
for example be a contract between the parties that is closely connected to the tort in 
question.
87
 In a foreign direct liability case it is highly unlikely that such a previous 
relationship exists between the parent and the claimants. Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that a connection would be sufficiently strong for the exception to apply. The word-
ing of the provision; “manifestly88 more closely connected”, indicates that it is only 
meant to be given effect in exceptional cases. This restricted application is also em-
phasized by the Commission.
89
 In the making of Rome II the Parliament proposed 
for a more flexible exception. This proposal contained several examples of factors to 
be taken into consideration, one of which were “the policies underlying the foreign 
law to be applied and the consequences of applying that law”.90 This factor may play 
a role in the proceedings of a foreign direct liability case. Where a policy in the home 
country implies deterrence against harmful transboundary activities by international 
corporations this could give the court an adequate reason for applying the home 
country’s law instead. However, the  subsequent failure to include this factor in the 
final text (as opposed to other factors) and the emphasis on the need for choice of 
law rules providing predictability, in preference to flexibility, implies that this would 
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not be sufficient grounds for applying the general exception under the current regula-
tion.
91
  
3.1.3 Overriding mandatory provisions and public policy 
The regulation contains several provisions allowing recourse to provisions in the law 
of the forum state even if the law of another country is found to be applicable by 
Rome II. In connection to the Rome Convention the Court has defined overriding 
mandatory rules as national provisions so important to the protection of political, 
social or economic order of the Member State that they require compliance of every-
one within the territory of that state and all legal relationships within that state. A 
typical example of such rules is provisions intervening in private law relations in 
order to protect public interests. This would also include environmental regulations.
92
  
 
Article 16 provides that the court shall always apply rules of the forum state’s “over-
riding mandatory provisions”. The Rome Convention contained the same provision.  
Contrary to what was provided by the convention,
93
 only the rules of the forum state 
can have this overriding ability and not those of a third state. Whether a provision in 
the law of the forum state (lex fori) is of such a character that it demands application 
is to be decided by the legal system of the forum state itself. Rules of a mandatory 
nature are not easy to identify because their inherent features are not indicated 
through the explicit wording but rather by an interpretation of the intention of the 
legislator of that forum.
94
  
 
Article 26 gives priority to the “public policy” of the forum regardless the law found 
applicable by the Regulation. This is a typical ordre public-rule. Contrary to article 
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16 on overriding mandatory provisions, article 26 does not authorize the court to give 
overriding effect to lex fori. Article 26 excludes the applicability of a rule that would 
otherwise apply under the Regulation.
95
 In connection to article 27 of the Brussels 
Convention concerning the similar provision regulating enforcement of judgments, 
the Court has expressed that it is up to the domestic courts to determine the content 
of its public policy, but the Court has authority to review the limits within which the 
Member State can apply such rules.
96
 The same is likely to be given to article 26 in 
Rome II.
97
 
 
Both article 16 and 26 are intended to have a narrow application. According to recital 
32 of the Regulation they shall only be applied in exceptional circumstances. It is 
difficult to foresee the applicability of overriding mandatory rules in a foreign direct 
liability case because the question of what rules should be given this characteristic 
and the content of them is subject to the forums state’s own discretion. These provi-
sions are generally not cast with the protection of third parties in a host country in 
mind and are usually only meant to regulate legal relationships within the territory of 
the home country.
98
  If such rules are applicable, they may well have an impact on 
the outcome in a foreign direct liability claim. This would for example be the case if 
the home country has higher standard rules concerning the environment that are con-
sidered to have this character, such as for example “the polluter pays” principle.  
3.1.4 Environmental damage 
Article 7 of Rome II regulates the choice of law when the non-contractual obligation 
arises out of environmental damage. According to this article the choice will be gov-
erned by the general rule in article 4 (1). In addition, an exception is added to the 
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general rule in matters of environmental damage. Article 7 also provides an oppor-
tunity for the person sustaining the damage to choose the law of the country of the 
event “giving rise” to damage. The reasoning behind this freedom of choice is envi-
ronmental protection. Recital 25 refers to article 174 of the Treaty as a justification 
for discriminating in favor of the person sustaining the damage in such cases. This 
rule would contribute to removing the incentive of the operator to establish produc-
tion in a low-protection country. In addition the interests of the victim of environ-
mental damage would be protected through the laws of the tortfeasor’s home coun-
try. Thus, these considerations prevailed over the general lex loci damni rule in the 
shaping of this provision, because the solution provided by the general rule would be 
contrary to the underlying philosophy of European substantive environmental law 
and the “polluter pays” principle.99 
3.1.4.1 Scope of application 
There are several elements in the wording of the provision and its initial purpose 
challenging the applicability in the context of a foreign direct liability case.  
3.1.4.1.1 Environmental damage 
What qualifies as “environmental damage” is described more closely in the pream-
ble. According to recital 24 of the Regulation this should be understood as “adverse 
change” in a natural resource such as land, water or air. This implies that there would 
have to be a damage of certain significance, either in terms of quantity (such as num-
ber of persons affected or size of impact on natural resources) or quality (such as the 
seriousness of the problems caused).
100
  “Impairment of function” of such a natural 
resource “for the benefit of” another resource or for the public also falls under the 
definition. Damage to biodiversity is also covered as an “impairment of the variabil-
ity among living organisms”. The next step would then be to establish a causal link 
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between the environmental damage and the damage “sustained by persons or proper-
ty”. It is important to note that if the damage is considered to be environmental with-
in the Regulation’s definition, the general exception in article 4(3) will not be appli-
cable. Article 7 only refers to article 4(1). Accordingly, if the exception from the lex 
loci damni rule does not give application to the home country’s law, the claimant’s 
case may be considered under the law of the host country, regardless of whether a 
manifestly closer connection can be proven under article 4(3).   
3.1.4.1.2 Non-EU claimants 
The claimant in a foreign direct liability case will most likely not be based in a 
Member State. In regards to article 7’s scope of application an important question is 
therefore whether the Regulation is also meant to apply to environmental damage in 
non-Member States.
101
 Article 3 provides a universal application. According to arti-
cle 3 the law chosen by the provisions in the regulation shall be applied “whether or 
not it is the law of a Member State.” Such a universal application is nothing new, as 
the same rule is included in the Rome Convention, The Hague conference conven-
tions and domestic private international law.
102
 This implies that the provision on 
environmental tort will also apply to non-Member States. On the other hand, the 
Commission gives the impression that article 7 is meant to regulate the “classic” sce-
narios of transboundary environmental damage such as pollution by dumping toxic 
waste an international river. The Commission refers to “the international dimension” 
of environmental damage and “neighboring countries” when arguing in favor of the 
need for such a provision.
103
 This implies that article 7 was not initially meant to 
apply in cases where the environmental damage occurred on another continent and 
that the provision is therefore not constructed to be given application to the sort of 
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environmental tort claims promoted in foreign direct liability cases.
 104
 On the other 
hand, the Commission does not explicitly limit the scope of article 7 to transbounda-
ry harm. The Commission may have emphasized this form of harm as the most prac-
tical example, without intending it to be a limitation. Furthermore, the actual wording 
of the provision itself does not invite for such a narrow interpretation. In addition, 
article 3 explicitly provides for the Regulation to have universal application, thus 
giving it application to cases involving parties outside the EU. According to the 
Commission, article 3 narrows down the number of possible sets of choice of law 
rules applicable in accordance with one of the overall purposes of the Regulation 
which is to provide legal certainty.
105
 The wording of article 7, together with the uni-
versal application laid out in article 3, therefore suggest that the provision is also 
applicable to claimants outside of Europe. This interpretation of the wording is also 
in accordance with the overall purpose of article 7, which is not to provide the claim-
ant with the benefit of a choice, but to promote the Member States interests in pre-
venting the occurrence of pollution and thus, raising the general level of environmen-
tal protection. Giving the claimant the opportunity to choose the law of the highest 
standard merely promotes this interest.
106
 Thus, article 7 must be interpreted as hav-
ing application also to foreign direct liability claims.  
 
With that being said, one might argue whether it is fair for to have EU-based compa-
ny risk litigation and ultimately be held liable under its own country’s environmental 
regulations and, by doing so, being deprived of the benefit of establishing a subsidi-
ary abroad. This consideration is likely to have been in the legislators mind since 
interest behind the provision seems to be limited in favor of the defendant by the 
application of rules of safety and conduct in article 17, which will be discussed fur-
ther below.  
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3.1.4.1.3 “Giving rise” 
For the option of choice in article 7 to be applicable to a foreign direct liability case it 
must be established that the event “giving rise” to the damage occurred in the parent 
company’s country. Thus, the claimant must prove that there is some form of con-
nection between the parent company’s actions or omissions and the damage sus-
tained by the subsidiary.
107
 What degree and type of connection is required here and 
if an omission is even sufficient to establish a causal link, is unclear. The same issue 
appears in regards to the application of article 17 below and gives rise to a series of 
questions concerning the parent company’s role in the subsidiary’s operations. This 
will therefore be discussed in a separate section below.
108
 
3.1.5 Rules of safety and conduct 
Article 17 provides that when the rules of the place where the event giving rise to 
damage occurred is not applicable, the rules of safety and conduct in force where the 
events giving rise to the liability shall still be taken into account when assessing the 
conduct of the person claimed to be liable.
109
  
 
One question is whether these rules of safety and conduct in article 17 refer to rules 
of public law or if this also includes conduct-regulating rules of tort.
110
 According to 
recital 34 “rules of safety and conduct” includes all regulations “having any relation 
to safety and conduct”. The commission’s report refers to these rules as “public” 
when describing the relationship between this provision and article 7.
111
 The legisla-
tive history and drafting of this provision favor the conclusion that only public law 
rules are included.
112
 
                                                 
107
 Calster (2013) p. 240 
108
 See chapter 3.2 
109
 COM/427/2003 p. 25 
110
 Enneking (2012) p. 164 
111
 COM/427/2003 p. 20 
112
 Enneking (2012) p. 164 
32 
 
 
The Commission notes that taking into account the other country’s rules does not 
correspond with applying them. The provision is based on the fact that a person must 
act in accordance with such rules in force in the country where he operates. The court 
should therefore be able to apply these as a point of fact when assessing the character 
of the tortious act. This could for example be when assessing the seriousness of the 
alleged act or the good or bad faith of the author of the damage.
113
 If the provision is 
meant only to regulate the use of such rules as a matter of facts relating to the case, 
which the preparatory works seems to be clear on, it is not really a true choice-of-law 
rule
114
 that would give the claimant in a foreign direct liability case the opportunity 
to benefit much from it. As will be illustrated in the following, this is one of several 
issues indicating that article 17 was not formed with the case circumstances charac-
teristic to a foreign direct liability case in mind, and that the provision may not have 
much to offer in favor of the claimant in this context.    
3.1.6 The relationship between article 7 and article 17 
Article 17 appears to be relevant to a foreign direct liability case where the parent 
company has moved its activities through a subsidiary to another country where the 
rules of safety and conduct do not reach as high standards as the rules of the home 
country.
115
 It appears to give the court the opportunity to take such rules of the home 
country into consideration when assessing the alleged tortious activity, even though 
the rules of the country where the damage occurred is found to be the applicable law, 
namely the law of the host country.
116
 This would of course be under the assumption 
that the parent company’s actions or omissions are seen as “giving rise” to the dam-
age as required by article 17.  
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However, if the home country can be considered the place where the event giving 
rise to the damage occurred, then the claimant would already have the opportunity of 
choosing the law of the home country by virtue of article 7. Nothing indicates that 
the expression “giving rise” in both provisions is meant to be understood differently. 
Thus, article 17 does not appear to offer any additional opportunities for the claimant 
in a foreign direct liability case in relation to article 7.  Furthermore, when describing 
the relationship between this provision and article 7, the commission provides the 
same impression.
117
 In a situation where the author of the environmental damage has 
acted in accordance with the rules of safety and conduct in a low protection country 
the court should, in the Commission’s view, be able to consider the fact that he acted 
in accordance with the rules in force at the time in the country where he is in busi-
ness.
118
 This implies that article 17 is meant to offer the perpetrator some relief when 
the court is to assess the character of his conduct, and not the victim of the damage. 
Thus, article 17 seems to curb the effect of article 7’s purpose which is to strengthen 
the position of the claimant located in a low-protection country. It has even been ar-
gued that such an application of article 17 works contrary to the very spirit of article 
7 and “polluter pays” principle.119  
 
How the relationship between article 17 and article 7 will influence cases on envi-
ronmental damage in general and foreign direct liability cases concerning environ-
ment specifically remains to be seen. The regulation is still fairly new and not much 
case law from Member State courts or the Court has been produced yet.
120
 Having 
regard to the above interpretation, it does however not look like article 17 will have 
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the influence on the outcome of such cases as might have been previously estimat-
ed.
121
  
3.2 Placing the tortious event with the parent company 
As has been demonstrated above, in attempts to seek compensation from an EU-
based parent company in its home country for damage sustained in the host country, 
the main rule laid out in article 4 is certain to give applicability to the law of the host 
country where the damage occurred. Thus, the claimant will not enjoy the higher 
standards of protection in the home countries law. There is however one possible 
exception; Foreign direct liability cases concerning environmental damage have been 
given a special position through the choice of law rule in article 7. If the event giving 
rise to the damage is proven to be defined as the actions or omissions of the parent 
company, the law of the home state will consequently be applicable to the case by 
virtue of article 7. The question is therefore how such operations of the parent com-
pany can fall under this definition.  
 
This is also has relevance to other provisions in European private international law 
where the event giving rise to damage is decisive. In regards to jurisdiction, Brussels 
I article 5(3) and 5(5) raises the same issues.
122
 In regards to choice of law, the inter-
pretation and application of article 7 will influence the application of article 17 as 
they contain the same term.  
 
Furthermore, this issue also leads to the necessity of exploring the question concern-
ing the role of the parent company in a foreign direct liability case in general; such as 
how this corresponds to the idea of the subsidiary as a separate legal entity and the 
parent company’s limited liability as a shareholder, and how the parent company can 
be held liable for the damage under substantive law.  
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This will be the background for the following discussion. 
3.2.1 Relation to substantive law 
The issue of placing the event giving rise to damage with the parent company is also 
closely linked to issues that will inevitably arise when the question of jurisdiction 
and applicable law in a foreign direct liability case is settled. The parent company’s 
liability for the damage is then to be decided by the applicable substantive law. Many 
foreign direct liability cases seek to hold the parent company liable by arguing that 
this company has failed to act in accordance with its own duty of care towards third 
parties in its involvement with the operations of its subsidiary abroad.
123
 
 
Placing the tortious act with the parent company will then to a large degree be equal 
to identifying the parent company as the tortfeasor. The event giving rise to damage 
does not necessarily correspond to an act that the applicable law identifies as “unlaw-
ful”.124 On the other hand, it is difficult to establish whether the parent company is 
the source of the event giving rise to damage, through failure to comply with such a 
duty, without establishing the content of the duty and the extent of it. In order to do 
so, recourse must be made to substantive law.
125
 Thus, identifying the operations of 
the parent company as “the event giving rise to damage”, within the meaning of arti-
cle 7 and other provisions in the relevant EU-regulations raises the similar questions 
as in regards to holding the parent company liable for the damage. 
 
In addition, the application of article 7 on parent companies in relation to environ-
mental damage executed by subsidiaries outside the EU would require a fairly broad 
interpretation of the wording in article 7. This question will eventually have to be 
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answered by the Court.
126
 Due to the current lack of an authoritative interpretation of 
article 7 however, approaches to parent company liability already developed in theo-
ry and by domestic case law may serve as directions on how article 7 can be inter-
preted as to place the tortious event with the parent company. 
3.2.1.1 Direct parent liability 
There are several different approaches to choose from when seeking to hold the par-
ent company liable depending on the specific circumstances of the case and the op-
tions provided by the law that is found to be applicable. Based on case law examples 
from Europe that are available so far, there is particularly one approach that has been 
applied. The common approach in foreign direct liability cases brought before Euro-
pean courts is that the claimants have argued in some way that the parent company is 
directly liable for the damage sustained. This form of liability is typically based on 
an alleged negligence of a duty of care for the parent towards third parties. In such 
cases the duty of care is usually considered to derive from the parent’s control over 
or involvement in the subsidiary’s operations in the host country. What separates this 
form of liability from indirect liability is in general the scope of the parent compa-
ny’s control. Direct parent liability focuses on the parent’s control over the harmful 
operations and the damages caused by them, while indirect liability for the parent is 
based on its control over the subsidiary as such.
127
 To ignore the legal separation 
between the parent company and its subsidiary by “piercing of the corporate veil” is 
considered a type of indirect liability.
128
     
 
A particular question in regards to direct liability based on the parent company’s con-
trol is whether this also applies where the controlling company is set to have neglect-
ed its duty of care through omissions rather than actions. For example where the par-
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ent company has knowledge of the subsidiary’s operations and that these operations 
cause environmental harm to the local community, does the parent company then 
have a duty of care to prevent or minimize such damage?  It is generally more diffi-
cult to establish an active duty to prevent harm than a duty to refrain from harmful 
activity through affirmative actions. Such a line of argumentation would enable the 
parent company to be held liable for the failure not to control the other company. 
This also challenges the doctrine of the shareholders limited liability.
129
 Extending 
the duty of care in such a way may result in a duty for multinational corporations to 
actively engage in the subsidiaries business and exercise control over them in order 
to prevent any kind of harm that they may be held liable for. That would entail a 
much more extensive obligation than a duty to act with due diligence when exercis-
ing such control. In cases where the claimant seeks to hold the parent responsible for 
their inactions, as opposed to their actions, will probably have difficulties being 
heard on an argument based on this form of liability.
130
       
 
The direct parent liability-approach provides several advantages for the claimant in a 
foreign direct liability case. Firstly, this locates the event giving rise to the damage in 
the home state of the parent company.
131
 As demonstrated above, this is an important 
factor in the question of jurisdiction, as well as the application of the choice of law 
rules. Secondly, the focus on the parent’s own actions may relieve the claimant from 
having to argue in favor of the less attainable result of piercing the corporate veil as 
an exception to the principle of limited liability for the shareholder.
132
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3.2.1.2 A domestic example of direct parent liability 
The following example of case law shows how a court argues when it establishes 
direct parent liability based on a duty of care and how the approach of this court is 
later applied by another court in a different case concerning environmental damage.  
 
In some common law jurisdictions the rule of direct parent liability is applied on par-
ent companies for the damaging activities based on a breach of the parent’s duty of 
care towards the third parties abroad. This ground for liability was applied in the case 
of Chandler v. Cape case (Cape case). This case is similar to the Lubbe v. Cape plc 
case as they both concerned asbestos injuries caused by a subsidiary.
133
 On the other 
hand, this case does not have the international aspect, as both the claimant and the 
defendant were located in the UK. The claimant, Mr. Chandler, was a former em-
ployee with the subsidiary, Cape Building Products Ltd, who discovered years later 
that he had contracted asbestios from working there. The subsidiary no longer existed 
at the time of the lawsuit.
134
 The claimant consequently sought compensation from 
the England-based parent company, Cape plc, instead.  
 
The English Court of Appeals presented the three-stage test used in English law to 
establish whether a duty of care existed, namely; that the damage must be foreseea-
ble, that the relationship between the parties is one of proximity and whether it is 
fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty.
135
 It referred to previous foreign di-
rect liability cases
136
 like Connelly v. Rio Tinco Zino Corporation and Ngcobo v. 
Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd v others and held that there is nothing in in either 
judgments or general law supporting the defendant’s argument that a duty of care can 
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only exist where the parent company has absolute control over the subsidiary.
137
 In 
this case, the court emphasized that the question at hand did not in any way concern 
an issue of piercing the corporate veil. It noted that “There is no imposition or as-
sumption of responsibility by reason only that a company is the parent company of 
another company.”138 It further noted that “The question is simply whether what the 
parent company did amounted to taking on a direct duty to the subsidiary’s employ-
ees.”139 The court held that there was a direct duty of care owed by the parent com-
pany towards the subsidiary. The parent company’s omission to advise the subsidiary 
on precautionary measures concerning the operations, despite their lack of certain 
knowledge of the link between asbestosis and asbestos dust, was a breach of this duty 
of care.
140
  
 
This case demonstrates that English tort law contains a rule establishing liability for a 
parent company toward third parties. It also shows that the idea of the parent compa-
ny and its subsidiary as separate legal entities does not necessarily stand in the way 
of establishing liability. In the context of foreign direct liability, the reference to for-
eign direct liability cases also implies that this may also occur when the subsidiary is 
located abroad.
141
  It is important to note that the company in this case was held lia-
ble because they did not encourage or instruct its subsidiary to implement precau-
tionary measures despite its knowledge of the risks. This does not mean that the par-
ent was liable for its omissions alone, because it was already exercising control over 
the subsidiary’s health safety issues.  
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This case specifically concerns the relationship between the parent company and its 
subsidiary’s employees. It is not clear whether this precedent would be feasible at all 
to environmental damage or if this basis for liability is limited to situations where 
there is (or has been) a clear connection between the third party and the subsidiary, in 
form of for example a contract, which makes the distance between the claimant and 
parent company shorter than for example between the parent and a local claimant 
falling victim to pollution caused by the subsidiary’s operations. It is hard to estimate 
beforehand how environmental damage will affect the surroundings, and to what 
extent, which might affect the conclusion under the foreseeability-criteria. However, 
one could also argue that for this particular reason it may be fair to expect the com-
panies involved in such business to take extra precautionary measures.  
 
For the same reasons, the proximity-criteria may also be difficult to fulfill since the 
damage can affect an entire local community. The three-stage test that the court ap-
plied in this case was a test established in preceding English case law through the 
case of Carparo Industries plc v. Dickman where the court referred to a relationship 
characterized by the law as one of “proximity” or “neighborhood”.142 The word 
“Neighborhood” implies a looser connection than what was in fact the situation in 
the Cape case where the claimant was a former employee and may extend the appli-
cation of this criterion to a local community or other claimants who are not in con-
tractual relationship with the defendant.  
 
The court in the Royal Dutch Shell cases referred to this decision when determining 
liability for the parent. It concluded that a parent company could be held liable under 
English and Nigerian tort law for harm caused by its subsidiaries, but also that such 
liability could not be established in the case at hand. The court did not find the crite-
ria of proximity to be fulfilled. It held that the relationship in question was not nearly 
as close as the one between the two companies in the Cape case. The duty of care of 
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a parent company towards the employees of a subsidiary in the same country, com-
prising only a limited group of people, was not comparable to the duty of care of a 
parent in an international group of oil companies towards people living in the vicinity 
of a subsidiary’s facilities. In the latter situation, the company would consequently 
owe a duty of care towards an unlimited group of people in several countries. The 
court did not find that extending a duty of care in this way would be fair, just or rea-
sonable. The court also noted that, even though the subsidiary’s business in both cas-
es involved health risks, there were several differences.  The business of RDS and 
SPDC were not considered to be the same. While RDS formulated general policy 
lines from its home country and was involved in worldwide strategy and risk man-
agement, SPDC’s business consisted of oil production in Nigeria. In addition, there 
was nothing indicating that the parent company should have more knowledge of the 
risks connected to the subsidiary’s operations in Nigeria. The parent in the Cape case 
on the other hand, had superior knowledge of the health risks related to asbestos.
143
  
Another distinction between the cases was made. The subsidiary in the Cape case 
directly inflicted the damage by allowing employees to work in an unhealthy envi-
ronment, while liability for SPDC would be based on the fact that it failed to prevent 
third parties from indirectly causing damage to the locals by sabotage. Accordingly, 
the court rejected the applicability of direct liability based on negligence of a duty of 
care in this case.
 144
 
 
It appears that the nature of oil spills of being unpredictable in respect to the extent 
of the damage and the group and number of people affected was one of the decisive 
factors leading to the court’s conclusion on this matter. Based solely on the Dutch 
court’s application of these criteria for parent company liability under common law, 
this approach is not likely to be successful in a foreign direct liability case concern-
ing environmental damage. On the other hand, both cases also illustrate how the 
                                                 
143
 [2011] EWHC 951 (QB) paras. 76-78 
144
 LJN BY9854 paras. 4.26-4.32 
42 
 
evaluation is closely connected to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, 
which implies that a parent company may be held liable for environmental damage if 
the “right” case is brought before English courts or courts within a jurisdiction with 
similar applicable provisions. One can only speculate what the conclusion would 
have been if the oil spills were caused by lack of maintenance and not by sabotage. 
In addition, damage occurring due to lack of sufficient health and safety measures 
towards employees may in some cases also materialize in a way that can be classified 
as environmental damage and therefore also be subject to article 7.  
3.2.2 Relation to company law and EU law 
Different areas and definitions under EU law may be eligible to shed light on the 
issue of placing the tortious act with the parent company and also how this would 
relate to the shareholders limited liability.  
3.2.2.1 The notion of limited liability and corporate groups in EU law 
Despite several previous efforts there are currently no EU instruments regulating 
corporate groups.
145
 A reflection group established by the Commission submitted a 
report in 2011 on the future of EU company law acknowledging that the international 
group of companies has become the dominant form of European large-sized enter-
prises, with subsidiaries both inside and outside Europe. 
146
 The lack of an overall 
regulation of this issue does not mean that the subject of corporate liability has re-
mained untouched by European case law and that it is impossible to identify some 
general principles from the Court’s practice.  
 
There is no general definition in EU law on the concept of limited liability. In the 
case of Idrima Tipou AE v. Ipourgos Tipou kai Meson Mazikis Enimerosis the Court 
gave an interpretation of this notion in accordance with the First Company Law Di-
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rective. The case concerned the legality of Greek law providing that shareholders 
with a holding of over 2.5 percent in national radio- and television companies could 
be fined together with the company. 
147
 The Court recalled that the Directive regu-
lates certain types of companies identified by the European legislature as having lim-
ited liability, but did not prescribe what a company having limited liability must 
be.
148
 The Court observed that the law of most Member States does not hold share-
holders of companies mentioned in article 1 of the Directive personally responsible 
for the debts of a company enjoying limited liability. That did not mean that this was 
a general principle of company law given application under all circumstances and 
subject to no exceptions.
149
 Thus, the Court confirmed that there is no general defini-
tion in EU law on the notion of “limited liability”. Furthermore, the decision affirms 
that the adoption of the doctrine “piercing of the corporate veil” is left to the compe-
tence of each Member State, seeing as this doctrine has evolved as an exception from 
the rules governing limited liability companies. 
150
  
 
Even if a clear definition does not exist in EU law, it can be established that limited 
liability is an unwritten principle of EU company law
151
 and that potential deviation 
from this principle is left to the discretion of the Member States domestic law. If vic-
tims of environmental damage in the host country attempts to hold the parent compa-
ny liable based on arguments under company law, they would have to come up with 
exceptions to this rule. Such exceptions would only apply in exceptional cases.
152
  
The better option would be to evade this focus on the relationship between two sepa-
rate legal entities in preference of a focus on the tortious action.  
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Placing the event giving rise to damage with the parent company may give rise to a 
discussion on the notion of a shareholder’s limited liability, which is traditionally 
considered to belong under the law of companies. It has been advocated that this dis-
cussion is therefore not subject to the rules in Rome II. Article 1 (2) (d) explicitly 
exempts issues regarding company law from its scope of application. Thus, when the 
event giving rise to the damage is argued to be actions or omissions by the parent 
company towards its subsidiary, the issue may fall outside the scope of Rome II in its 
entirety and will have to be decided based on domestic choice of law rules.
153
 How-
ever, a distinction must be made between tort-based liability for the parent and the 
company law related doctrine “piercing of the corporate veil”. The first concerns 
holding the parent company liable for the damage sustained based on its own actions 
(or omissions) towards the subsidiary.  The latter refers to making an exception to the 
fundamental notion of the parent and subsidiary as two separate legal entities by 
holding the parent liable for the subsidiary’s actions in exceptional cases.154 Foreign 
direct liability cases are usually characterized by their tort-based liability ap-
proach.
155
 Even though, there is not necessarily always a clearly defined line between 
these two grounds for liability,
156
 the issue of placing the event giving rise to the 
damage with the parent company should therefore be considered a question of tort 
law in this context and not company law. Thus, this issue can be situated within the 
scope of the interpretation of article 7.   
 
This does not mean, however, that the discussion on placing the event giving rise to 
the damage with the parent company does not raise issues that may run counter to 
these fundamental ideas in company law. Even though applying a tort-based ap-
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proach is designed to focus on the parent’s control over the harmful events, the doc-
trine of limited liability may still impose difficulties for the claimants. Wherever lia-
bility of parent companies and their subsidiaries is involved in a case, the notions of 
the companies in a corporate group as being separate legal entities and the sharehold-
ers limited liability are likely to be discussed, or at least mentioned.
157
 Domestic 
courts are likely to be hesitant towards creating precedents potentially leading to un-
limited liability “by the back door”. On the other hand, courts should also be careful 
putting decisive weight on the corporate form, when the issue at hand is liability. The 
answer should be based on whose actions gave rise to the damage within in the cor-
porate group, and not on the form of the group’s internal relationships.158 Further-
more, even though these rules are important facts of EU law and domestic law, this 
does not mean that one should allow being seduced by the corporate veil even in sit-
uations where the veil serves merely as an illusion concealing the factual circum-
stances. This should, in my opinion, also be the case when placing the tortious event 
with the parent company is at issue. 
3.2.2.2 Development in EU competition law 
There is one interesting example from EU case law where liability has been estab-
lished for the parent company for the operations of its subsidiary. Under EU compe-
tition law the parent company may be held liable for the unlawful conducts of a sub-
sidiary without necessarily having had a direct involvement in this conduct. This is 
possible when the subsidiary’s conduct on the market is not based on its own deci-
sions, but regulated by the parent’s instructions.  In such situations the companies are 
considered to have formed a “single economic unit.” When the parent is the single 
shareholder of the subsidiary accused of infringing the rules, this even leads to the 
presumption that the parent in fact exercises a “decisive influence” over the subsidi-
ary. This approach is, however, restricted to issues concerning EU competition law.
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159
 As long as the doctrine of the “single economic unit” has this limited application, 
it is unlikely to have relevance in the domestic proceedings of a foreign direct liabil-
ity case. However, it does serve as an example of how focus on the factual circum-
stances of the relationship between two separate legal entities, as opposed to the for-
mal relationship between them, can lead to a different result. In addition, the emer-
gence of this form of practice might be taken as an indication of EU law being able 
to attribute more weight to realities rather than formalities in cases concerning corpo-
rate groups.  
3.2.2.3 Environmental liability directive 
It has been advocated that a link can be made between the parent company as the one 
giving rise to the damage under article 7 and the wide definition of the “operator” 
given in the Environmental liability directive. According to article 6 to 8 the “opera-
tor” is the one responsible for the damage. According to article 2(6) of the Directive 
an “operator” is defined as “any natural or legal, private or public person who oper-
ates or controls the occupational activity or, where this is provided for in national 
legislation, to whom decisive economic power over the technical functioning of such 
an activity has been delegated”. Such an interpretation is similar to the court’s rea-
soning in the previously mentioned case of Lubbe and others v. Cape plc. The ques-
tion to be answered in this case was whether the court had jurisdiction. However, the 
court also mentioned that a discussion of the issue of the parent company’s responsi-
bility towards an overseas subsidiary would include what part the parent company 
played in controlling the operations of the group.
160
 This is also a similar to the 
court’s reasoning in the Cape case.  This analogy between a parent company pos-
sessing control over its subsidiary and the definition of the operator also resembles 
the court’s reasoning in a Norwegian example of domestic case law, which will be 
presented in the following. 
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3.2.2.3.1 The Hempel case 
The Hempel case is a decision from the Norwegian Supreme Court where the Danish 
company Hempel was held responsible for paying the cost for inspections in relation 
to its Norwegian subsidiary Hempel Coating’s pollutive activity in Norway. During 
the period when the pollution occurred there was a series of mergers and demergers 
which eventually resulted in the establishment of the company Hempel Coatings, 
which was liquidated in 2001. The subsidiary company, Hempel Coatings was a re-
sult of a merger with a former subsidiary of Hempel and another Norwegian compa-
ny. Hempel owned 100 % of the shares in Hempel Coatings.
161
 In 2004 Norwegian 
authorities ordered the parent company to pay the costs for inspection of the polluted 
area. The authorities claimed to have legal basis for holding both Hempel and 
Hempel Coatings responsible for carrying out the inspection in section 51 of the 
Norwegian Pollution Control Act.
162
 The requested inspections were carried out,
163
 
but Hempel sued the government claiming that article 51 did not provide a legal ba-
sis for holding the parent company responsible and sought reimbursement for its in-
spection costs. 
164
  
 
The court concluded that section 51 did provide with a responsibility for the parent 
company to carry out inspections relating to pollution caused by its subsidiary.  It 
based its conclusion on an interpretation of the relevant provision, but when doing 
so, it also reviewed the relevance of the principle of the shareholder’s limited liabil-
ity in such a context. Section 51 provided the authorities with the opportunity to or-
der someone who is in possession of something which leads to, or might lead to, pol-
lution to bear the costs of necessary inspections. In its argumentation the court relied 
on the on the provision’s wording and purpose and the Pollution Act in general. The 
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court referred to the “internationally acknowledged principle” of “the polluter pays” 
which provides that the person or entity drawing economic benefit from the polluting 
activity shall also bear the costs of that activity. Section 51 was considered to be a 
result of this principle.
165
 On the other hand, the court also considered the sharehold-
er’s limited liability to be a basic principle of corporate law. The interpretation of 
article 51, however, did not concern the question of the shareholders liability in gen-
eral, but rather liability of a shareholder which has actual control over a subsidiary.  
In such cases it would be reasonable, in the courts view, to draw the conclusion that 
the parent company is in the possession of something (that “something” being the 
subsidiary) within the meaning of article 51. The court argued that this interpretation 
would also contribute to the realization of the “polluter pays” principle and noted that 
the subsidiary’s business will usually be of vital interest to the parent company. This 
interpretation would, according to the court, also be in line with the authorities need 
to be able to impose the costs for the pollution on the one who has the economical 
interest. Furthermore, interests of an efficient enforcement of the rules favored the 
conclusion that the relevant provision was not to be interpreted as to exclude the pos-
sibility of holding a parent company responsible.
166
 Based on these arguments, the 
court found that section 51 could be applied as a legal basis for imposing an obliga-
tion towards the parent company to pay the costs of inspection. The decision was 
unanimous.
167
 
 
Although the Hempel case has an international aspect, it lacks the North-South con-
stellation that would resemble a foreign direct liability case. The parties in this ex-
ample are two neighboring industrialized countries with similar legal traditions. An-
other aspect that differentiates this case from the previous description of foreign di-
rect liability cases is that this is a dispute between a public authority and a company 
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instead of two private actors. Even though the basis for the lawsuit was that the com-
pany sought compensation, this claim was not based on tort, but on the authorities’ 
allegedly wrongful interpretation of a public provision. These atypical characteriza-
tions set aside; the case has relevance as an example of domestic case law where 
public interests, in form of environmental protection, seems to have been given 
greater weight than the fundamental idea of the company as a separate legal entity. 
 
There are several interesting issues in this case which distinguishes it clearly from 
the Cape case and other similar cases on direct parent liability. First of all, the court 
does not question whether the parent in fact had any possibility of preventing the 
environmental damage through controlling the subsidiary.
168
 In this connection, it 
should also be noted that much of the pollution in the Hempel case was caused by the 
subsidiary’s predecessor.169 Furthermore, the court does not evaluate whether there 
was some sort of negligence from the parent and does not imply that fault is in any 
way a requirement for liability.
170
 The court seems to base the conclusion merely on 
the actual control the parent company often has over a subsidiary, regardless of how 
this control materializes. The Cape case on the other hand required not just a degree 
of control from the parent, but also control resulting in a duty of care that has to be 
breached through the parent’s negligence. Furthermore, the Cape case focused on the 
parent’s control over the harmful operations rather than the control over the subsidi-
ary. It should also be noted that the court does not discuss whether the mergers and 
demergers were carried out by the company in order to avoid responsibility for the 
damage, thus, implying that this is not necessary to examine in this case, or in future 
similar cases in order to establish liability.
171
 Based on the court’s omission to exam-
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ine these factors, holding the parent company responsible in this case, seems to have 
been a lot easier than it is in case law concerning direct parent liability.  
 
The court defined “the polluter” as a person or entity drawing economic benefit from 
the pollutive activity. A parent company as a shareholder also draws economic bene-
fit from such activity. Therefore, it may be argued that the court simply extended the 
“polluter pays” principle to apply not just to the actual polluter, but the person who, 
in the end, is the one best fit to carry the burden. This could make the case merely 
about how this principle is to be given effect through a specific provision given in 
domestic public environmental law. On the other hand, the extension of this principle 
could also be adapted further to encompass cases concerning pollution where the 
other party is a claimant seeking compensation from a company. 
 
The Supreme Court in this case is not absolutely clear on whether the case strictly 
concerns the interpretation of an environmental provision or if the court in fact pierc-
es the corporate veil. It has been pointed out that, regardless of the court’s own clas-
sification, it is difficult from a company law perspective to reckon it as merely an 
issue of environmental law.  
 
It has been advocated that the case in fact is about whether the corporate veil may be 
pierced in order to place the responsibility, not on the polluter, but on the parent in its 
capacity as a shareholder.
172
 If it is considered to be an example of corporate veil 
piercing, it shows that there is a possibility for the veil to be lifted in favor of other 
pressing societal interests.
173
 If it is not considered to be an example of corporate veil 
piercing, a similar line of argumentation when identifying the one responsible for the 
costs of the damage could still be significant to the establishment of foreign direct 
liability for environmental damage. This is mainly due to the court’s focus on the 
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control the parent company is presumed to have over the activities of its subsidiary 
and how environmental concerns are given significant weight throughout the court’s 
reasoning.  
 
In a case subsequent to the Hempel case, the former employees of a bankrupt subsid-
iary sought to have their unpaid wage demand paid out by the parent company. The 
claimants argued that the Hempel case constituted a basis for piercing of the corpo-
rate veil for the benefit of other pressing social needs, in this case, for the benefit of 
the protection of the employee. They argued that considerations concerning employ-
ees’ rights should not have a different position than environmental considerations in 
such situations. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and held that the Hempel 
case could not serve as precedent for piercing of the corporate veil and also referred 
to the fact that the Supreme Court had found the interpretation of section 51 difficult 
despite the pressing social needs at stake.
174
 The further appeal to the Supreme Court 
was rejected.
175
 
 
Thus, the lower court did not see the Hempel case as a matter of corporate veil pierc-
ing and it does not seem like the Supreme Court, through its rejection of the appeal, 
felt the need to clarify or correct this statement. Based on this decision, the Hempel 
case cannot be classified as corporate veil piercing. It also implies that pressing so-
cial needs, other than environmental, are not meant to be given the same status in 
Norwegian law.  
 
Nevertheless, it is an example of a European domestic court placing environmental 
concerns before the shareholder’s privilege of limited liability. It remains to be seen 
whether this case was just a peculiar single incident or whether it is the starting point 
of a durable trend in domestic environmental law.  The way the court interprets the 
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provision in section 51 to be given a wide application has similarities to the fairly 
broad definition of the “operator” in The Environmental Liability Directive. The Di-
rective does not apply to civil claims arising out of environmental damage
176
 and the 
Hempel case concerned national authorities’ access to instruct a company to pay the 
costs of necessary inspection. However, the fact that these are initially matters of 
public law,  does not necessarily mean that the definitions of the “operator” or “pol-
luter” should be applied differently in a case of civil liability for environmental dam-
age where locating the event of the tortious act is the issue.  
 
When applying the tort-based approach applied in foreign direct liability cases it 
would however be necessary to establish a causal link as well, which means that the 
control over the subsidiary in itself is not sufficient. In addition, according to Rome 
II article 1(2)(d) the liability of “members as such for the obligation of the company” 
is exempted from its application.
177
 It is therefore likely that when the liability is ar-
gued to be based solely in its capacity as a shareholder, this would be considered a 
question of company law, making Rome II inapplicable.  
3.3 Conclusion 
According to the main rule laid out in article 4(1) of the Regulation it is highly likely 
that the law of the host country will be chosen as the applicable law in a foreign di-
rect liability case.
178
  
 
If the host country’s law is found applicable, there are still other provisions in the 
Regulation that may affect the outcome of the case. It is not likely that article 17 will 
have significant impact on a positive outcome for the claimant but it might be given 
application favorable to the defendant. The overriding mandatory rules in article 16 
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and 26 can be used to offer the claimant protection under the home country’s law. 
This is however difficult to foresee, as the application of these rules largely depends 
on the content of the legal system in the forum. 
 
In foreign direct liability cases concerning environmental damage, the choice of law 
might be decided in favor of the home country’s law under an interpretation of article 
7. First of all, article 7’s scope of application must not be limited to the classic forms 
of transboundary harm. Secondly, it is possible to identify the parent’s operations as 
the events “giving rise” to the environmental damage.  
 
This issue is closely related to the question of holding the parent company liable for 
the damage under the applicable substantive law. In order to have a chance of suc-
ceeding in this, the claimant could choose a tort-based approach with the aim of 
holding the parent company directly liable for the damage by arguing negligence of a 
duty of care towards the claimant.  
 
Where it is possible to establish a link between the operations of the parent company 
and the damage sustained, it does not make sense to let legal principles governing 
companies stand in the way of this circumstantial fact. 
 
Examples from EU law on environment and the domestic example of the Hempel 
case shows that the idea of the parent company as the “operator” or “polluter” may 
serve as a guideline in the interpretation. However, placing the event giving rise to 
the damage solely based on the parent company’s control over the subsidiary is un-
likely. 
 
The question of whether article 7, and other provisions where the place of the tor-
tious event is decisive, can be interpreted in this manner will ultimately have to be 
decided by the Court.  
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4 Foreign direct liability in the development of CSR 
The concept of corporate social responsibility has been given numerous different 
contents and definitions. The Commission published a new policy on the subject in 
2011, where the definition put forward was “the responsibility of enterprises for their 
impacts on society”.179 Foreign direct liability is just one of many approaches to-
wards holding multinational corporations accountable for their wrongful actions to-
wards society. The focus of this thesis has mainly been whether the company is like-
ly to be held accountable for such actions in a particular case. Another question is 
whether such cases in general are capable of molding multinational corporations’ 
behavior in society. This chapter will tentatively indicate what role foreign direct 
liability might play in the promotion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
how this new form of litigation is perceived within the EU.  
 
As foreign direct liability cases become more common in Europe, the threat of hav-
ing to face litigation at home may become a more relevant factor for the parent com-
pany when involving themselves in its subsidiary’s conduct. This threat can be iden-
tified as a factor in the consideration of costs.
180
 The costs of for example improving 
health and safety measures in the host country may well be exceeded by the litigation 
costs itself. The costs of compensation in the event that the claimants win the lawsuit 
must also be added to the bill. However, the case may also lead to a settlement, 
which is quite common.
181
 This threat can also be identified as factor concerning 
reputation. The Trafigura received extensive media attention which, regardless of 
whether the media coverage was fair or correct, put the company in a very bad 
light.
182
 Even if the case does not go further than a settlement, if the dispute gains 
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attention by the media, it might have an impact on the company’s business. This is 
especially a likely scenario if the company is a producer of consumer merchandise.
183
   
 
In the Commission’s new policy on CSR the concept is further described to consist 
of the company’s actions “over and above their legal obligations” towards society 
and environment.
184
  Foreign direct liability cases may narrow the gap between the 
social or moral expectations we have towards corporate actors and the legal obliga-
tions which can be imposed on them. Corporations’ business in developing countries 
may be considered socially irresponsible by the home country, but within the legal 
system where they operate, the business is perfectly legal. What foreign direct liabil-
ity cases have the ability to do is transforming these moral obligations into legal ob-
ligations. Legal obligations may be easier for companies to grasp, as the consequenc-
es of not acting in accordance with them are more immediate and tangible. This may 
also motivate the corporations to implement a responsible business practice through-
out the organization which go beyond what is expected according to the current leg-
islation in the host country.
185
 
 
Foreign direct liability might help the claimant in a particular case to obtain justice. 
But if the aim is to adopt an overreaching regulatory system for CSR, this form of 
legal strategy is destined to fail in pursuit of that aim due to its inherit nature. Foreign 
direct liability is not systematic
186
 and the prospects of obtaining justice depend 
largely on the specific circumstances of the case.  
 
How foreign direct liability can affect CSR in Europe also raises the question of the 
EU’s attitude towards foreign direct liability. The European Commission’s Enter-
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prise and Industry Directorate General commissioned a study which was completed 
in 2010 exploring the legal framework on human rights and the environment appli-
cable to European enterprises operating outside the EU. This report shows that the 
EU is aware of issues concerning the operations of EU-based companies’ subsidiar-
ies abroad. The report does not discuss foreign direct liability specifically, but ad-
dresses relevant issues under European private international law. One of the conclud-
ing recommendations was to extend the application of the Brussels I Regulation to 
include third-country subsidiaries.
187
 As provided in chapter 2, this recommendation 
was not followed in the final recast of Brussels I. In the Commission’s new policy on 
CSR the Commission stated that it intended to publish a report on the implementa-
tion of UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights where this report will 
also be considered.
188
 However, such a report has not yet been published. The Com-
mission has submitted an amicus curiae on behalf of the EU in two previous foreign 
direct liability cases brought before US courts on basis of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act.
189
 However, the Commission did not address the issue of foreign direct liability 
cases within the EU in this connection.  
 
Thus, it is not clear whether the EU is positive towards foreign direct liability or 
whether it sees this as a feasible tool for promoting CSR. This may be because, even 
though it is a much discussed topic, there are to my knowledge still just a handful of 
these cases that have been brought to Europe.
190
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis was written with the ambition of exploring how legal obstacles in the 
claimant’s pursuit of justice in a foreign direct liability case concerning environmen-
tal damage brought before European courts can be overcome. Foreign direct liability 
in the promotion of CSR in Europe was also to be tentatively indicated.  
 
As regards to jurisdiction, the Brussels I Regulation assigns jurisdiction over cases 
against the EU-based parent company to the court of the company’s home state and 
may under certain circumstances provide the claimant with e choice of different 
Member State forums.  Jurisdiction over a third-country subsidiary will have to be 
decided by application of the home state’s domestic rules of international law.  
 
As regards to applicable law, the Rome II Regulation is likely to give application to 
the law of the host country with the exception of applicable overriding mandatory 
provisions and public policy exceptions. In certain circumstances, a broad interpreta-
tion of article 7 on environmental damage may provide applicability of the home 
state’s law when the event giving rise to damage is placed with the parent company. 
This conclusion is supported by the wording of the provision, its purpose and the 
universal application of the Regulation together with rules of EU law and domestic 
law already opening up to the possibility of holding the parent company liable for the 
subsidiary’s operations.  
 
As regards to the long accepted ideas of corporate groups consisting of separate legal 
entities and the shareholder’s limited liability, this does not have to stand in the way 
of placing the tortious event with the parent company. 
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As regards to foreign direct liability cases playing a role in the promotion of CSR, 
the reality of facing this form of litigation may be a factor in molding EU-based 
companies’ involvement in the operations of its subsidiary. The EU is yet to give an 
explicit opinion on the union becoming a base for foreign direct liability cases and 
whether this can be a tool in the promotion of CSR.  
 
In conclusion, concerning the overall possibility of establishing liability for an EU-
based parent company in these cases, it should be noted that there are several other 
obstacles the claimant must overcome that have not been discussed here. These 
would be for example the geographical distance, the financial and psychological bur-
den of initiating such a lawsuit and difficulties of obtaining necessary evidence. 
 
Nevertheless, establishing foreign direct liability for environmental damage in Eu-
rope is legally possible. Whether this possibility will be present, or even improved, in 
the future will largely depend on the EU’s willingness to facilitate the legal process 
by taking into account the comprehensive consequences of environmental damage, 
the complex reality of multinational corporations’ activities and the possibility of 
applying foreign direct liability as a tool in the development of CSR. 
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